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China’s controversial Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) has been subject to ample 
scrutiny since its inception in 2013. 
Practical results could be said to be severely 
lacking in contrast to the project’s 
ambitious plans. Chinese engagement 
abroad has irrefutably intensified since Xi 
Jinping assumed power in 2012, but 
whether this can be classified as the fruits of 
BRI remains unclear. China, in fact, is 
developing BRI on the go. That gives the 
EU an opportunity to engage with BRI and 
remold it into a more desirable form. 
Because China increasingly sees Europe as 
BRI’s “final destination”, the EU has a lot 
more leverage than it commonly assumes. 
 
 “When we whittle away all the things that the 
Belt and Road is not, there isn’t much left to 
see.”1  Over the years, BRI has grown to 
encompass a wide – and arguably unconnected – 
array of Chinese activities abroad, and has even 
received dubious praise for projects with barely 
any Chinese involvement at all. The construction 
of Turkey’s Marmaray rail tunnel is an example of 
this, as the tunnel was allegedly funded by a 
Turkey-EU-Japan consortium, but was later 
lauded by the World Bank as a “model BRI-
investment”.2 
 
Chinese scholars have done little to dispel 
outsiders’ doubts about the vagueness of the 
project and the lack of concrete results, especially 
during its early phase. The 17+1 cooperation 
framework in Eastern and Central Europe is 
hailed as “exemplary” for BRI construction, but 
predated BRI by a year.3   The 2009 purchase of 
the Piraeus port by COSCO is presented as a 
crucial link in BRI development, while the start 
of the lease occurred four years before Chinese 
president Xi Jinping introduced BRI.4   
 
Therefore, the argument that BRI lacks a long-
term strategy, or even, “barely exists at all”, is to 
a certain degree understandable. Nevertheless, 
this paper will argue that while BRI may indeed 
be lacking in strategic depth at the moment, 
Chinese policy-makers have been taking a 
deliberate “adjusting while doing” attitude, 
especially in regards to cooperation with 
developed countries. This pragmatic stance 
 
 





provides adjustment opportunities for willing  
assertive international actors to (re)mold BRI into 
a more “desirable” form. As the EU has recently 
been aiming to engage more actively in 
realpolitik, since in 2016 the Union declared 
“principled pragmatism” to be the prime guiding 
principle for its foreign and security policy,5 it 
could step up to the plate and actively engage 
with BRI in order to change it. 
 
BRI: FROM REINVENTING THE WHEEL TO 
OLD MULTILATERALISM 
The precise content, connotations, and 
definitions of BRI have been considered to be 
ambivalent since the project’s very inception, 
even more so by non-Chinese scholars. The 
initiative was originally assumed to be focused on 
infrastructure development and investment in 
countries on the historic Silk Road, but the scope 
seems to have greatly increased while the content 
of the initiative appears to have been drastically 
transformed over the last few years. 
 
When Xi Jinping introduced BRI in late 2013, he 
mainly spoke of reviving the Old Silk Road 
through improved connectivity and 
infrastructure, with the lofty aim of creating win-
win projects.6   However, if one compares this 
speech to more recent discourse by China’s 
paramount leader, great differences can be 
discerned. At the opening ceremony of the 
Second BRI forum in 2019, Xi reiterated his 
support for free market principles and macro-
economic policy coordination, and promised to 
safeguard intellectual property rights. He also 
stated that China would increase its imports, and 
assured the world that the country would keep 
opening up its economy to foreign investors.7   
 
The BRI-debate among Chinese scholars, who 
are often predisposed to follow government 
rhetoric, has also evolved over the last few years. 
During the early phase of the project, a large 
quantity of BRI-related treatises showcased an 
increased sense of self-confidence among 
Chinese academics. This self-confidence gave rise 
to an intent to “reinvent the wheel” by proposing 
BRI as an alternative to the current Western-
dominated world system. For example, in 2016 
one scholar proposed that from the angle of 
critical geopolitics, BRI might construct a new, 
interconnected spatial imagination, which can be 
understood in the ancient Chinese “yin-yang 
schema”.8    In the same year another academic 
stated that China’s theoretical system of 
“Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” has 
proven to be superior to any foreign system. 
Therefore, by 2049 – the PRC’s 100th 
anniversary – China should dominate the 
structures of global governance through BRI.9  
Ironically, the authors’ description of the “old” 
Western structures is considerably clearer than 
the priorities and policies of the novel BRI-based 
model. This is a returning phenomenon in BRI-
related treatises: it seems easier for Chinese 
authors to meticulously describe the Western 
system and pinpoint its many faults, than to 
propose a clear alternative system with BRI at the 
core. 
 
While the transformation of the debate on BRI in 
China has been gradual, Xi Jinping’s January 2017 
speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos 
can be considered a turning point. Indirectly 
responding to the election of Donald Trump, Xi 
positioned himself as a protector of globalization 
and sustainable development.10 This narrative 
shift had its due consequences for the discourse 
on BRI, which started to include themes like 
multilateralism, green development, and anti-
protectionism. Furthermore, the “reinventing the 
wheel” rhetoric began to be toned down 
significantly. An article from 2019, for instance, 
concluded that China’s economic rise “merely” 
mirrors that of Japan during the 1980s and 1990s, 
i.e. gradually catching up on the US without yet 
 
 





being able to create an alternative economic and 
geopolitical system. 11  
 
BRI AND BRUSSELS: FROM BILATERAL 
NEGLECT TO MULTILATERAL PRIORITY    
BRI’s goals in relation to the EU have also 
evolved. While there has recently been a sharp 
increase in the number of Chinese papers on 
cooperation with Brussels under BRI, Chinese 
scholars initially seemed to prefer bilateral 
cooperation with EU member states. This was an 
application of the “taking a case or two as an 
example for the rest to follow” theory originally 
put forward by Xi Jinping: “examples” of 
successful cooperation under BRI were expected 
to attract the attention of third nations. This idea 
– originally aimed at Sino-Pakistani cooperation 
– was extrapolated to Europe. An article from 
2016, for example, suggested that Hungary, the 
first EU member state to sign a joint statement 
on BRI, might play such a pioneering role in 
Europe and could “set the BRI ball rolling 
West”.12 
 
This bottom-up approach in convincing other 
countries of BRI’s advantages has not been fully 
successful. Recently, more attention has been 
given to dual-track and top-down cooperation 
with both member states and the EU as a whole. 
Chinese scholars appear to have realized that 
mechanisms such as 17+1 have not resulted in 
greater acceptance of BRI, but instead have given 
rise to fears of “divide and rule” tactics.13  A sharp 
contrast is visible with the aforementioned 
“reinventing the wheel” discourse, which 
perceived BRI as a novel structure, with policies, 
norms, and values that stand apart from, and are 
bound to supersede, the “inferior” established 
Western order. Furthermore, while Western 
Europe and the EU institutions originally were 
excluded from the BRI, or at least were deemed 
to be of secondary importance, recent discourse 
sees them as the “final destination” of the 
initiative. 
 
Unlike the eulogization of BRI in the Chinese 
academic debate, criticism of BRI is often 
carefully veiled by citing European scholars. A 
popular method to convey criticism is quoting 
the discourse of EU-affiliated think tanks on 
BRI, with the alleged objective of “guiding” the 
think tanks to “a more objective and fair 
understanding”, while clearing up 
“misunderstandings” about BRI.14 While indirect, 
one should not underestimate the significance of 
such carefully-selected critical quotations, as they 
show that the EU’s gripes with BRI have reached 
the ears of Chinese academics, and that room for 
discussion, and potentially even concessions, has 
increased. 
 
FROM EMPTINESS TO SUBSTANCE: BRI’S 
PRAGMATIC ROUTE  
Even with the recent decline of the “reinventing 
the wheel” discourse, and more prominently, the 
inclusion of Brussels in the scope of BRI, opinion 
on the content and goals of the project remains 
ambivalent at best. Nevertheless, it is important 
to bear in mind that Beijing’s seemingly “empty” 
approach to BRI might be deliberate, or even 
culturally embedded. An argument could be put 
forward that the cultural differences in 
approaching long-term strategic thinking 
between China (“Confucian, collectivistic, 
inclined to start with constructing a grand 
narrative”) and Europe (“Christian, 
individualistic, inclined to start with making clear 
and feasible plans”), have caused certain 
misunderstandings surrounding BRI’s objectives, 
or lack thereof. 15  
 
To employ a famous allegory, Chinese long-term 
strategic thinking somewhat resembles the 
ancient game of go, with stones being placed 
seemingly randomly until a pattern eventually 
 
 





appears, a posteriori giving strategic significance 
to the initial “random” moves. Western strategic 
thinking might instead resemble chess, with many 
specific and clear short-term set pieces giving 
meaning to a predefined long-term result. The 
aforementioned BRI timetable can be seen as an 
example of Chinese strategic thinking, in 
particular the abstract statement that by 2049 a 
worldwide “community of common destiny” will 
have been established under the auspices of BRI, 
without providing specific steps to achieve this 
grand objective.16 
 
Even when putting aside possible cultural roots 
of strategic thinking, there is ample ground to 
conclude that the “empty” Chinese approach to 
BRI is deliberate. China’s Reform and Opening-
up campaign (from 1978) is another recent 
example of an initially “empty” strategy with very 
grand goals, an ambiguous heading for a 
hotchpotch of many divergent local experiments 
(“go-stones”), which seemed to lack overall 
coherence. Narratives on which reform-types 
were “right” and “wrong” were only constructed 
in the latter stages of the campaign. The 
comparison between BRI and China’s domestic 
reforms was also noted by other scholars. Mao 
Xinya and Men Jing, for instance, stated that 
while Brussels would like to see a clear roadmap 
for BRI with defined geographic boundaries, 
Beijing has instead taken a pragmatic “adjusting 
while doing” approach based on domestic 
economic reforms.17   
 
This paper therefore argues that China’s bilateral 
cooperation under the said “empty” heading of 
BRI should be seen against this background. 
Countries like Hungary, Serbia, and Kazakhstan, 
whose involvement in BRI is the focus of a lot of 
European scrutiny, are not the final destination 
for the project, and should instead be viewed as 
“present-day go-stones” to test a wide array of 
policies that might eventually serve as substance 
for BRI. However, unlike China’s highly 
successful economic experiments in the 1980s, 
the “test phase” of BRI has been much less 
fruitful. The transformation of the BRI-debate 
from “reinventing the wheel” to “looking at 
established structures”, can therefore be seen as 
a reflection of the failure of the bilateral 
experiments in adding substance to BRI’s 
strategic dimension. Chinese policy-makers have 
become aware that failures abroad are much 
harder to readjust than the occasional setbacks 
during the domestic economic reforms. 
 
Therefore, having realized the failure of Xi 
Jinping’s pragmatic “taking a case or two as an 
example for the rest to follow”, Chinese policy-
makers are increasingly looking for inspiration to 
an established multilateral project of the “old 
order”: the EU. 
 
BRI: A SUITABLE TEST-CASE FOR THE 
EU’S PRINCIPLED PRAGMATISM 
Realizing both the emptiness of BRI and the 
current lack of strategic momentum by the 
Chinese, is a crucial first step in increasing 
strategic awareness in the EU. BRI should be 
framed as the defining attempt of Xi Jinping, the 
first unrivaled “leadership core” of the CCP in 
decades, to leave a greater mark on history than 
his predecessors. Therefore, the EU’s terms of 
trade vis-à-vis China are a lot better than most of 
the Union’s policy-makers seem to realize, as the 
EU has the power “make-or-break” the project. 
While cooperation with Europe might resemble 
a small cog, Chinese scholars have emphasized 
that the continent is BRI’s “final destination”. 
From the perspective of the Chinese 
government, neither the Sino-Pakistani economic 
corridor nor the proposed corridors in South-
East Asia could ever match the potential prestige 
of a “grand Eurasian cooperation” with the EU. 
Furthermore, Chinese policy-makers are 
desperately searching for more stable BRI-
 
 





cooperation in the wake of the ambiguity, debt 
trap allegations, and general failures surrounding 
most projects in Central Asia, and, to an lesser 
extent, Central and Eastern Europe. Considering 
the current economic uncertainty due to 
COVID-19, one might expect the trend to look 
for safer BRI-cooperation to continue.  
 
Among all officially listed BRI-partners in 
Chinese discourse, most of which have 
questionable economic credibility, only the EU as 
a whole and its Western European member states 
can provide BRI with badly needed economic 
stability and overall legitimacy. The Union 
consequently can attempt to gain economic 
benefits by increasing cooperation between its 
own connectivity strategies and BRI, and remold 
the project from within by making conforming to 
EU standards a requirement for joint initiatives. 
Overall, Chinese scholars have welcomed such 
initiatives (e.g. the European Silk Road and the 
2014 Junker Plan), remarking that they will enable 
China and Europe to achieve pragmatic win-win 
results on an equal basis.18  In this context one 
should once more take into consideration that 
Chinese policy-makers are looking to fill the 
“emptiness” of BRI, and the EU’s own 
connectivity platforms could provide them with 
inspiration.  
 
 Increased Chinese research on the ongoing BRI-
debate among European think tanks 
demonstrates that Chinese scholars are looking 
for a new way forward. The EU should be aware 
of the strong position it has towards China. After 
all, in face of China’s worsening relations with 
most developed countries outside Europe (Japan, 
South Korea, Australia, Canada, and the US), the 
Union and its Western European member states 
are the only potential “developed” partners left 
for China and its BRI. 
 
Therefore, BRI is the perfect opportunity for the 
EU to implement its “principled pragmatism”. 
The Union must explore the fine line between its 
non-negotiable principles (“red lines”) and the 
pragmatic reality that China is an authoritarian 
power that has shown great resilience to 
democratic reforms. As the CCP will likely 
continue to rule China for the unforeseeable 
future, it is important to emphasize that the EU 
should hold on to the “pragmatic” element of its 
foreign policy concept. China has shown itself to 
be resolutely opposed to the EU’s previous 
unilateral focus on “values-based diplomacy”. 
Even Chinese scholars that have an overall 
positive attitude towards deepening cooperation 
with the EU seem to dread the memory of 
Brussels’ constant promotion of democratization 
and human rights over the last few decades, 
which they have perceived as a direct attempt to 
overthrow the country’s governmental system.19 
 
While democratization as a topic could be 
“pragmatically ignored” for the sake of 
cooperation, excessive human rights violations 
should still be condemned, however. Another 
“red line” that should be maintained is the 
demand for an unconditional end to “divide and 
rule” tactics against the EU – such as China’s 
“face-mask diplomacy”. The EU should remind 
China that it has committed itself to support 
European integration and reinforcement of the 
EU’s economic union.20  The EU can take a 
“transactional” – realpolitik – approach to defend 
itself against China’s “divide and rule” approach 
by threatening to limit Chinese access to the 
European market; sanctions and embargos can 
be considered. Fortunately, such drastic measures 
probably are not required. In order to achieve its 
objective of a moderately prosperous society, 
China also needs more “face” internationally. 
Thus, Brussels threatening to limit or terminate 
certain prestigious BRI cooperation initiatives 
 
 





should be enough to make the country reconsider 
most of its “divide and rule” practices. 
 
Convincing EU member states that a unified 
standpoint towards China also increases their 
own terms of trade vis-à-vis the country is 
imperative. This is a tall order, considering the 
rise of populism – and even authoritarianism – in 
certain member states. Therefore, Brussels must 
adopt a pragmatic approach towards the member 
states that have so far shown themselves to be 
most open towards bilateral cooperation with 
China under BRI (Greece, Hungary, and Italy, 
among others). Greece, for example, could be 
reminded that in spite of the EU’s harsh terms 
for financial support in the aftermath of the 2008 
financial crisis, the Union has at no point required 
the country to lease one of its ports to it for 35 
years in return for this support. 
 
EU policy-makers have to understand that 
despite China’s staunch opposition to the 
Union’s “values-based diplomacy”, the country is 
still very much interested in the EU’s 
supranational and multilateral institutions. This 
provides the EU with additional leverage. 
Chinese scholars have, for instance, examined 
whether the EU’s regulations on tax collection, 21  
as well as its dispute settlement mechanisms,22   
could be applied to the BRI countries. China 
seems particularly interested in how the EU’s 
treaties maintain both binding force while still 
recognizing cross-country cultural and 
developmental differences. This provides the EU 
with an opportunity to “transactionally” share 
this knowledge with China, while pragmatically 
(re)molding the structures that China wishes to 





CONCLUSION: DON’T YIELD TO PESCO-
PESSIMISM 
As one of the final international actors of the 
developed world still enjoying somewhat cordial 
relations with China, the EU should be aware of 
its leverage. In the face of the strategic emptiness 
of BRI, Chinese scholars have lost part of their 
initial confidence in promoting the initiative as a 
novel structure that is destined to eventually 
supersede the “old Western order”. Instead, they 
are looking for multilateral cooperation with the 
very order they originally dreaded in order to 
provide substance for BRI. EU policy-makers 
have to be aware that the “emptiness” of BRI 
could be deliberate, thereby providing the Union 
with a unique opportunity to jointly decide the 
project’s future direction. 
 
Said policy-makers should be aware of China’s 
internal narrative shift on BRI, take notice of the 
EU’s improved leverage, highlight their own 
connectivity platforms to influence BRI, and use 
creatively “principled pragmatism” so as to 
remold BRI into a more desirable shape, on its 
own terms. An end to China’s “divide and rule” 
approach against the EU should be an 
unconditional red line throughout this process, 
while at the same time, the Union must 
pragmatically convince its own member states 
that a unified approach to China is in the best 
interests of all. 
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